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I. SUMMARY 
Let {xn} be independent random variables with a common distribu- 
tion function F(x). We observe the x,, sequentially and can stop at any 
time; if we stop with x, we receive the payoff f,,(xr,. . ., x,,). Problem: 
What stopping rule maximizes the expected payoff ? It is shown that for 
f&1, * . . > x,) = x* - c-la, 
where c > 0 is the cost per unit observation, the optimum stopping rule 
when the first moment of the x, exists is: Stop with the first x, > u 
where u is the root of the equation 
s (x - u) dF(x) = c; 
the expected payoff is then Q. This result is proved in Section II. 
Two directions of generalization of the problem will be given and 
discussed in the succeeding two sections. 
A more realistic version of the problem deals with the situation where 
the population from which random variables are drawn has an unknown 
distribution function. We shall treat in Section III the case in which the 
distribution is normal with known variance and unknown mean. 
Section IV is concerned with the problem of two populations. Here 
the problem is that of maximizing the expected payoff in, at most, N, 
and N, drawings from the populations IZr and ITa, respectively, when 
at each drawing we are free to choose between n1 and &. The results 
obtained in Section II are applied in this section to derive the optimal 
design of sampling. 
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In this paper, we shall consider all these problems by means of discus- 
sions of the functional equations derived from the corresponding decision 
processes. Using techniques in the theory of dynamic programming [l] 
we shall determine the structures of the optimal rules for the problems. 
II. OPTIMUM STOPPING RULE 
Let us suppose that we are playing a game in which we are allowed 
to make as many as N successive draws from a hypothetical population 
with the cumulative distribution function F(x). We are allowed to stop 
the game at the end of any draw, and are payed an amount equal to the 
result of that draw minus the total cost of observations previously drawn. 
At each step, the decision of whether or not to continue clearly depends 
on (1) the value just drawn, and (2) the stage of the game. Our first 
statistical problem is that of finding a strategy which will maximize the 
expected payoff. This problem is clearly a generalization of a problem 
in the Sasieni-Yaspan-Friedman book [3, p. 2811 and a variant of a 
problem considered by Robbins 121. 
Using the functional equation technique of dynamic programming [I], 
we can easily solve this problem as follows: 
Let us define the sequence of functions 
~Jx) = expected payoff, obtained using an optimal rule when 12 stages 
are left in the future and starting with the observed value x just drawn 
at the previous stage, 
for PZ = 0, 1,. . ., N - 1. 
Then it is evident that we have 
f&x) = x - cN 
fn+l(X)=max [zl ~~l:d;,l[“‘/, n=O,l,...,N-2 (1) 
where the symbols S and C in the maximand at the right-hand side of 
the equation refer to the possible actions, to be chosen by the decision- 
maker, “stop sampling” and “continue sampling,” respectively. 
It is easy to solve these equations and we get 
f,Jx) = max (x, ,u,, - c) - (N - n)c, n=O,l,...,N-1 (2) 
where {,uun} is the sequence of numbers defined by the recurrence relation 
,u, = max (x, ,u,- I- c) C(x), (n=l,...,N;~~=- co) (3) 
where the integrals are assumed to exist. 
The optimal choice, when IL stages are left in the future and the 
value .E was observed at the previous stage, is made according to the 
following rule: 
I 
if .z: > {I,, - c, stop sampling; 
I if continue sampling 
(4 
5 < i(j,, - c, 
for n=O,l,.,., N- 1. 
For n = N we need another consideration, since we have no previous 
observation for the case. If we do not enter the game at all, the return 
is of course zero, If we enter the game, the expected payoff will be 
s /A’-l(Y) WY) = I { max (y, ,U.V - r - c) - c}dF(y) = plv - c 
by (2) and (3). Thus we have a rule which determines the optimal initial 
choice, when any observation is not yet drawn, as follows: 
i 
if 0 > ,IA,~ - c, do not enter the game; 
if 0 < ,uhl - c, take the first observation. 
Summarizing the above we get: 
(5) 
THEOREM 1. The o$timum stopping rule for the *robbern is determined 
by (5) and (4). The expected payoff obtained usi~rcg the optimal rule is 
mas (,M~ - c, 0). 
Let us now introduce a nonnegative and nonincreasing function 
A(x) E max (y - x, 0) dF(y) = (y - x) dF(y). P-4 
Then (3) can be rewritten as 
pm=A(pu,-1-C) +/In-l-c. (7) 
We at once have the 
COROLLARY 1.1. If c = 0, the critical numbers pr,. . . , ,uuN which char- 
acterize the optimzcm stofiping rule of the problem are given by 
pn = A(pu,-1) + pn-11, n=Z,...,N (8) 
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It c > 0, an interesting result is obtained when we let N + 03. 
COROLLARY 1.2. If c > 0 and if we are allowed to make an infinitely 
many succesive draws from the $o$ulation, then the optimum sto##ing rule 
is as follows: 
I f 
I 0 > u(c), do not enter the game; 
1 if 0 < a(c), take the first observation 
and then, continuing the succesive observations, stop with the first x, > u(c), 
where a(c) is the voot of the epation 
cc 
A(a) E 
5 
(x - a) C(x) = c. 
a 
(9) 
The expected payoff is then max (a(c), 0). 
PROOF: The critical numbers ,x,,, given by (3), which characterize 
the optimum stopping rule for fixed N, do not depend on the particular 
choice of N. Hence we have only to show that the sequence (,u,,} converges 
and that 
Let 
lim pn = E(C) + C. 
n+m 
B(x) 55 A(x) + x 
and 
Y, = (u, - c 
then (7) can be rewritten as 
Yn = I?(&&-1) - c. (11) 
Now we can easily see (as in Fig. 1) the convergence of the sequence (Ye} 
defined by (II), if we assume the strictly decreasing property of A(x) 
near x = a(c). The limit of convergence is given by the root of the 
equation 
x = B(x) - c 
i.e., A(x) = c. If c > 0 and A(x) is strictly decreasing for every x, then 
the root a(c) of the equation (9) exist uniquely. This completes the proof 
of the corollary. 
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Next we shall show several examples of the critical numbers p,, or X(C), 
(a) NormaL distribzrtiorz 
dF(x) = #x) dx, $&c) E (27c- w esp (- x2/2) 
FIG. 1 
We have for every x 
since we have 
m 
5 
Y+(Y) dY = w 
x 
for every x. Thus if c = 0 we get by (8) the strictly increasing 
sequence , 
/%a = d(pn- 1) + pn - I(1 - @(pun - l)L n = 2,3,. . . ; p1 = 0. (8’) 
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We obtain, for example, 
n 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
P+f 0.399 0.629 0.790 0.912 1.011 1.090 1.160 1.223 1.276 
In the case of normal distribution with mean 0 and variance a2 we 
can easily find that the critical numbers v, are given by 
VW = apu, + 0 
where ,u,, are defined by (8’). 
Table I gives the numerical values of A*(x) = C(x) - x@(x) for 
- 2.00 < x < 3.00. 
(b) Exponential distributioc 
dF(x) = p-l e- Nfl dx (x20)* 
We have for x 3 0 
m 
A(x) = 
5 
(y - x)/$-l e-Y/P dy = p e- *ifi. 
s 
Hence if c = 0 we obtain by (8) the strictly increasing sequence 
,b = P exp (- ~4% - l/P) t- pn - I (n = 2,3,. . . ; p1 = p). 
For example, 
n 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
,uUn/P 1.368 1.623 1.821 1.983 2.121 2.241 2.347 2.442 2.529 
Next if 0 < c < j? then we have the unique positive root u(c) of the 
equation (9). 
44 = P log (P/c). 
(c) Poisson distribution 
dF(x) = e-e P/(x!) dm (m : counting measure). 
We have 
m 
A(4 = 
i 
(Y - 4 e- e eyl(y 1) dm(y ) = 8Ps( [xl) - xPe( [x] + l), 
* 
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where P&k) is the cumulative distribution function 
P&!) EE i e--u P,(x!) 
I ‘- k 
Thus, if c = 0, we get from (8): 
~~n=ePe([~,-i])+~~-l{l--e(i~~~-ijr1)} (n = 2,3,. . . ; fA1 = H) 
yielding, for example, 
I”2 = ace + @(l - Po(v4 + I)} 
= e(e-ew/[e]! $ 1). 
The numerical values of A(x) = BP& [xj) - xP,( [x I + 1) are given in 
Table II for 0 = 1(1)10. 
III. THE CASE OF NORMAL DISTRIBUTION U’ITH AN UNKNOWN MEAN 
The optimum stopping problem treated in the previous section can 
be generalized in two directions. The random variables may have unknown 
distributions; for example, the normal distribution with unit variance 
and an unknown mean. We have to extract and accumulate information 
about the unknown true parameter of the population distribution from 
succesive observations. The situation will be examined in this section. 
The other direction of generalization will be the problem of two 
populations. We have the two populations, distributions of which are 
both completely known. We are allowed to make at most N1 and N, 
successive draws from the two populations respectively, and are requested 
to get a maximum expected payoff. This problem will be considered in 
the next section. 
In this section we examine in detail the situation in which the random 
distribution variables have a normal distribution N(t9, 1) with unknown 
mean 0. We assume, however, that we do possess an a priori probability 
distribution for the value of 8, E(0). 
Let us define: 
f&p * . . > xN- ,J =. expected payoff, obtained using an optimal rule 
when PZ stages are left in the future and the observed values were 
at the preceding stages, 
..,N- 1. 
Our fundamental 
distribution function 
is given by 
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assumption is the usual one that the new a priori 
for 0 after 112 successive observations xi,. . . , x, 
J w+#J(x, - 0). . .&I - 0) d6 
where 4(x) z (Zn)- w exp (- x2/2). 
On the basis of this assumption, we obtain the fundamental recur- 
rence relation 
fn..1(X1,. . ., xx - n - I) (13) 
[ 
s: XN-n-l-(N-n-l)c 
= max 
c: f&l, 
55 
. . ..x‘v-n-1.Y)EI,....,n,_._1(~)~(Y--8)dedY 1 
(a = 0, 1,. ..,N-2) 
with /&xi,. . . , xN) = xN - cN. 
It is not difficult to show that we have from these equations 
fn(x1, * . .9 XAT--) = max (xN-,,,,~~(x~,. ., x~.-,,) - c) - (N - n)c (14 
(n=O,l,. ..,N-1) 
where the functions P~(x~,. . , x.~ -n) are defined by the recurrence 
relation 
p&,. . .I XN-8) (16) 
= {{max (y,p,-l(x,,. . ., XN - np Y) - C)tr,, ., .r,+#)+(Y - 6) d6’ dY 
for $2 = 2,. . . , N - 1 and with 
. 
p&p . . . > XN - 1) = 
I 
et,,, .,nN _ 1 (8) dO. 
The optimal choice, when n stages are left and the observed values 
at the preceding stages were x1,. . . , XN _ n, is made by the following rule: 
i 
if x~-~n)p&~.. . ., xN _ n) - c, stop sampling; 
W 
if otherwise, continue sampling 
for n==J,...,N-I. 
454 SAKAGUCHI 
For 12 = N we need another consideration. If we do not enter the 
game the payoff is of course 0. On the other hand, if we enter the game 
taking the first observation, the expected payoff will be 
/N-ll(Y)t(@+(Y - 0) ded3: 
. 
= 
1 
(max (Y, PN - I(Y) - 4 - c) dy 
I 
* iV4~(~ - 0) do 
=/&T--c 
where we have set 
(by (14)) 
Thus we have a rule which determines the optimum initial choice, when 
any observation is not yet drawn, as follows: 
i 
if 0 > @N - c, do not enter the game; 
if 0 </UN - c, take the first observation 
(18) 
The preceding results are summarized in 
THEOREM 2. The optimum sto#lzg rule for the problem is determined 
by (18) and (16). The expected payoff obtained us&g the optimal rule is 
max (pN - c, 0). 
Let us now introduce the two functions 
A*(x) z 
s 
max (y - X, O)+(y) dy 
and 
K(x) f A*(- x) - x 
for later use, Clearly A*(x) is a special form of A(x) defined by (6) when 
dF(y) = d(y) dy. It is easily shown that these functions are both strict11 
decreasing with values ranged from + 00 to 0. 
It is to be noted that an interesting and important simplification occurs 
if the prior distribution for 0 is normal, Let us consider the case in which 
and a is made to tend infinitely large. 
DYN$MIC PROGRAMMING 455 
Making the substitution (19) in the definition (12) of t,,, ,,zm (B), 
the direct calculation changes it to the form 
t I ,x1, ., (8) = (m + u-*p2 $1’” + (J-2)1’2 ( 
e, u-2 + mx, e - o-2+%- 1 
\ 1 
where 5Zm =_ (x1 + . . . + x,)/m. This expression tends to Vm +(V%(O- 2,)) 
as G ---, co, independently of 0,. Hence we have, in the limit case of 
o ---f co, from (15) 
N-2 
y,N--iZN-Z+3--- 
N-l 
x +(1/N - 2(0 - %-3))+(y - 0) d0 
since for every ,u and II (> 0) we have 
r3 max (y - !L + 212 C, 0)+ (y”p)dy=v-‘j Max (Y + vc, o)+(Y) dY 
zzc v-lA*(- vc). 
Similarly, we get, in the limit case of 0 c b, . . ,&(x1,. . . ,KY - 8) =is max (y, p2(x1,. . , .I’.\ _ ::, Y) (.I 
These derivations suggest that perhaps ,un(-zi,. . . , .ciY _ ,1) would always 
have the form 
f%&> 1 . a, xs - ,a) = 3% -n + K*,&) (20) 
where 
for 12 = 2,. . . , N - 1 with K1,,,, (c) I= 0 ; and we can immediately 
establish this by induction. 
Now we can state: 
C:OROLLAHY 2.1. Sad&?wse thut we ~musl necessudy efater the game. 
Then the oQl,imum stofiping rule ,/OY tke problem, in the case of normal +or 
rlistribut~oti for the unknown mean a& i+z the Limit case of infifde v&r~a%ce, 
is determined by (16) with p,,(+, . . . , xA7 _ ,,) defilzed by (20). The ex;bected 
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payoff is then 0 - c + max (ZCN-,,,v(c) - c, 0), cohere 0 is the zclzknoz,n 
true value of the mean of the normal population. 
PROOF: The first part is obvious by (14) and (16). We have only to 
show the second part. From (14) and (20) we see 
f.,.-l(x) = max (x,c~.~-r(x) - c) - c 
= max (x, x + 1C.v - r, S(C) - c) - c (24 
= x - c + max (KN - 1, Ar(c) - c, 0). 
Hence the result is immediate. 
As an example, if c = 0 we have by (21) the strictly increasing 
sequence 
iN;- 
/ Nun+1 ‘* (I / ‘N-n + l N-,, K-1,Np.y + K-l,N(O), 
(n = 2,. ..,N-l;K1,A~(0)-O). 
When N = 10, we get the values: 
92 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
K, lo(O) 0.376 0.591 0.737 0.847 0.930 0.993 1.036 1.058 
Stopping regions of the optimum rule are determined by 
Xm> %n + KN-m,~(o) (m = 1,. . .,N - 1) 
and the expected payoff is then 0 + max (KN-&O), 0). 
COROLLARY 2.2. Suppose thut we must necessarily enter the game, and 
assume that we are allowed to make an infinitely many successive draws 
from the poptilation. Let c > 0. Then the optimum stopping rule for the 
problem, in the case of normal prior distribution for the unknown mean and 
in the limit case of infinite variance, is determined as follows: 
stop with the first x,> f, + K,(c) - c, 
where K,(c) is defined by the leczlrrence relation 
K,(c) = (-&)lil K ][m$r’ (c - K,_,(c))] (63) 
for m= l,d,..., with K,(c) G :lim K&r-&c). The expected payoff 
is tlzeu 0 - c + max (K,(c) - c, 0). 
PROOF: From (20) and (%l), we hale lor e\~ry fixed vz 
Hence K,(c) s lim h’ ,V n,,V(~) exists for e\.er?. finite m and satisfies _ 
N-+cc 
(B), provided K,(c) exists. 
The author cannot prove convergence of li,V _l,,V(c) (LV + CQ). But 
if we can assume the convergence, then we can state the above corollarv. 
0 
t c 
x 
c-K(c) 
c-Kk-K(c)] 
FIG. 2 
Now we can easily see (as in Fig. 2) convergence of {tn} defined by 
i”,+i = K(c - 6,J where K(x) G A*(- X) - x. The limit of convergence 
is given by lim 6, = z*(c) + c, where CC*(C) is the unique root of the 
n---f5 
equation 
A*(a*) - c (x - a*)&%) dx = c. (24) 
It is interesting to note that (1) the lim A&(c) exists for every finite YZ 
N-CC 
and lim lim K,,(c) = a*(c) + c ; (2) if lim K,(c) exists, the limit 
n+m N-+m m+m 
is equal to a*(c) + c. 
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IV. OPTIMUM DESIGN FOR THE PROBLEM OF Two POPULATIONS WITH 
KNOWN DISTRIBUTIONS 
As previously stated at the beginning of the preceding section, we 
shall discuss here the case of two populations I7r and 17,, distributions 
of which are both completely known. We can make at most N, and N, 
successive draws from III and II2 respectively. We observe the random 
variables from I7r or from II, sequentially and can stop at any time. 
If we stop with I, from I7r(lT,) after +z = n, + n2 observations 
consisting of lzl drawings from III and n2 drawings from IT,, then we 
receive the payoff 
x,, - Cl n1 - c2 n2 (Yn - 5 n1 - c2 n2). 
\$‘e are requested to obtain a maximum expected payoff. The situation 
therefore is that after each observation we must decide whether to 
continue sampling or not, and if we decide to continue we must decide 
which population we should sample next. 
Let us define: 
fn,,n,(x) = expected payoff, obtained using an optimal rule when’ there 
remain nr drawings from I7, and ?za drawings from II, and starting with 
the observed value x just drawn at the previous stage for ni = 0, I,. . . , Ni 
(i = 1, 2), but with n, n2 # N, N,. 
Then we at once get 
I 
S: x - (N, - n, - I)c, - (N, - 1t2 - l)c,- 
fn, + 1, *, 4. I(X) = max 
C,: 
s 
fn,, n, + lb4 w4 
C,: 
s 
fn,+l,n,b) W-4 
S: x-(N-nn,-l)c,-NN,cz 
fn, +I, O(X) = max * 
c,: fn,,o(4 w4 I 
I’ 
S: x-N,c,-(N,-n2-l)c2 
45) 
~o,~,+I(x) = max 
c,: fo, &) dW4 
1 
?z,=O,l,..., N,--1; nz=O,l,...,N,-1 
with n, ns # (N, - 1) (N, - 1) in (25) 
fo,&) = x - N, Cl - N, 5 
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where F(u) and G(v) are the cumulative distribution functions of 17, 
and I7s respectively. 
From the second and third recurrence relations we obtain 
lx, o(x) = max (x, /6,t1J -- cr) -- (,Vr w)cr -- N2 ca 
I 
fo, %(x) = rnax (x, +L@J - cg) - N, cr - (N, - 12)~s r 
(26) 
respectively, where the sequences {,~,,(r)} and {,u~~(‘)] are defined b! 
pn(l) = I max (x, +&l r - ct) dt;(x), (n = 1,. . . ) IV, ; /la(l) = - c0) 
(27) 
pst2) = max (y, ,u~~L r - ca) dG(y), (lz=l,...,N,; &a)=- c0). 
combining these with the first fundamental recurrence relation (24) 
we can get fn,, n,(x) for every ni = 0, 1,. . . , Ni (i = 1, Z), except for 
n, n2 = N, N,. And the corresponding optimal choices are determined. 
A consequence of these facts is given by 
THEOREM 3. The expected payoff, for the $roblem of two populations, 
obtained using the optimum stopping rule is 
f~, - w,(u) d+), fN,, N, - I (0) WA 
I 
w 
where f~, - l,N,k) and fN,, I\]* - I (x) are derived from (25) and (26). 
PROOF. The expected payoff fLhT,,Ny when using the optimal rule is 
evidently equal to 
s: 0 
fN,, h', = mix 
c ‘1: fN, - l,N,(u) dF(u) 
fN,, N, - x('-') dG(v) 
where the symbols S and Ci (i = 1, 2) denote the actions “stop sampling” 
and “continue sampling from II,>’ respectively. 
An example in which the distributions are both normal is shown in 
the following and derivation of the optimal rules for several cases of 
various parameter values will be worked out numerically. 
Let 
Nx = N, = 2, Cl = c* = 0 
where 
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then we get from (27) and (26) 
/“l(i) = fJi 
and 
/“z(i) = ei + ui l$(O) (i = 1,2) 
f&4 = max: (x, 0,) 
/2o(4 = max (XI 4 + 3 (b(O)) 
fol(4 = max (xI 0,) 
fo2W = max (x, 8, + o2 $(O)) 
respectively. Substituting these in (25) we obtain 
fllW = max (k 4 
f12(4 = max (xt 03~~) 
fzl(4 = max (x, w2J 
wll z max 
c,: 
c,: 0,+0,c$(0) + o,A* ( 
e -z + a2 Yw) - 4 
5 1 
%2 z max 
c,: w11+ q?A* 011 - e2 
i 1 (72 
from which we finally get by (28) the expected payoff 
f2, = max (0, mz2) 
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where 
The optimum stopping rule will now be clear and we shall omit it. 
TABLE I 
THE NORMAL DISTRIBUTION A*(x) = sz (y - x)$(y)dy = 4(s) - x@(x) 
WHERE c+(X) G (2n)- '/'e- x'/2 AND Q(X) = s; +(y)dy 
~-__ 
- 1.9 
8 
7 
6 
6 
- 1.4 
3 
2 
1 
1.0 
- 0.9 
8 
5 
6 
5 
--__ 
- 0.4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
-- 
0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 
1.9890 1.9694 1.9500 1.9305 1.8910 
1.8917 1.8723 1.8529 1.8336 1.8153 
1.7950 1.7758 1.7566 1.7374 1.7183 
1.6992 1.6805 1.6611 1.6421 1.6232 
1.6044 1.5865 1.5667 1.5480 1.5293 
1.5107 1.4921 1.4736 1.4551 1.4367 
1.4183 1.4000 1.3818 1.3636 1.3455 
1.3275 1.3095 1.2917 1.2738 1.2561 
1.2387 1.2209 1.2034 1.1859 1.1686 
1.1.514 1.1342 1.1171 1.1002 1.0833 
1.0665 
0.9842 
0.9045 
0.8278 
0.7542 
1.0499 1.0333 1.0168 1.0004 
0.9680 0.9520 0.9360 0.9202 
0.8889 0.8735 0.8581 0.8429 
0.8128 0.7980 0.7833 0.7687 
0.7399 0.7257 0.7117 0.6978 
0.6840 0.6704 0.6549 0.6436 0.6304 
0.6174 0.6045 0.5918 0.5792 0.5668 
0.5545 0.5424 0.5304 0.5186 0.5069 
0.4954 0.4840 0.4728 0.4618 0.4509 
0.4402 0.4297 0.4193 0.4090 0.3989 
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0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 
0.0 0.3989 0.3892 
0.1 0.3509 0.3418 
0.2 0.3069 0.2986 
0.3 0.2668 0.2592 
0.4 0.2304 0.2236 
0.3793 0.3697 0.3602 
0.3328 0.3240 0.3154 
0.2904 0.2824 0.2745 
0.2518 0.2445 0.2374 
0.2169 0.2104 0.2040 
- 
0.5 0.1978 0.1917 0.1851 0.1799 0.1770 
0.6 0.1687 0.1633 0.1580 0.1528 0.1478 
0.7 0.1429 0.1381 0.1335 0.1289 0.1245 
0.8 0.1202 0.1160 0.1120 0.1080 0.1042 
0.9 0.1004 0.0968 0.0933 0.0899 0.0865 
1.0 0.0833 0.0802 
1.1 0.0686 0.0660 
1.2 0.0561 0.0538 
1.3 0.0455 0.0436 
1.4 0.0368 0.0350 
0.0772 0.0742 0.0714 
0.0634 0.0608 0.0584 
0.0517 0.0495 0.0475 
0.0418 0.0400 0.0383 
0.0336 0.0321 0.0308 
- 
1.5 0.0293 0.0280 0.0267 0.0255 0.0244 
1.6 0.0232 0.0221 0.0213 0.0202 0.0192 
1.7 0.0183 0.0174 0.0166 0.0158 0.0150 
1.8 0.0143 0.0136 0.0130 0.0123 0.0116 
1.9 0.0111 0.0105 0.0100 0.0095 0.0090 
2.0 0.0085 0.0081 0.0076 0.0072 0.0068 
2.1 0.0065 0.0061 0.0058 0.0035 0.0052 
2.2 0.0049 0.0046 0.0044 0.0041 0.0039 
2.3 0.0037 0.0035 0.0033 0.0031 0.0029 
2.4 0.0027 0.0026 0.0024 0.0023 0.0021 
2.5 0.0020 0.0019 0.0018 0.0017 0.0016 
2.6 0.0014 0.0014 0.0013 0.0012 0.0011 
2.7 0.0011 0.0010 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 
2.8 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 
2.9 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 
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0.1 0.9368 1.9135 2.9050 3.9017 4.9067 5.9006 6.9001 7.9001 8.9001 0.9001 
0.2 0.8736 1.8271 2.8096 3.8064 4.8014 5.8005 6.8002 7.8001 8.8000 9.8000 
0.3 0.8104 1.7406 2.7144 3.7055 4.7021 5.iOO7 6.7003 7.7001 8.7000 9.7000 
0.4 0.7472 1.6542 2.6200 3.6073 4.6027 5.6010 6.6004 7.6002 8.6000 9.6000 
0.5 0.6839 1.5677 2.5249 3.5092 4.5034 5.5013 6.5005 7.5002 S.dOOl 9.5000 
0.6 0.6280 1.4812 2.4929 3.4110 4.4040 5.4015 6.400.1, 7.4002 8.4001 9.4000 
0.7 0.5575 1.3947 2.3349 3.3126 4.3047 5.3018 6.3006 5.3002 8.3001 9.3000 
0.8 0.4943 1.3083 2.2388 3.2147 4.2054 5.2020 6.2007 7.2003 8.2001 9.2000 
0.9 0.4311 1.2380 2.1448 3.1165 4.1061 t5.1022 6.1008 7.1003 8.1001 9.1000 
1.0 0.3678 1.1989 2.0497 3.0183 4.0085 5.0025 6.0009 7.0003 8.0002 9.0000 
1.2 0.3150 1.0165 1.8896 2.8366 3.8166 4.8060 5.8024 6.8009 7.8004 8.8001 
1.4 0.2622 0.9135 1.7294 2.6549 3.6247 4.6094 5.6038 6.6015 7.6006 8.6002 
1.6 0.2093 0.7789 1.5692 2.4733 3.4328 4.4129 5.4053 6.4021 7.4009 8.4003 
1.8 0.1565 0.6602 1.4091 2.2916 3.2409 4.2164 5.2068 6.2027 7.2011 8.2004 
2.0 0.1036 0.5413 1.2490 2.1099 3.0472 4.0198 5.008" 6.0033 7.0014 8.0005 
3.0 0.0234 0.2180 0.6721 1.3480 2.1718 3.0818 4.0794 4.9631 6.0076 7.0033 
4.0 0.0044 0.0751 0.2194 0.7815 1.4368 2.1330 3.1196 4.0595 5.0288 6.0136 
5.0 0.0007 0.0225 0.1346 0.4103 0.8774 1.5125 2.2926 3.1592 4.0838 5.0430 
6.0 0.0000 0.0059 0.0507 0.1955 0.4933 0.9837 1.5933 2.3503 3.1995 4.1100 
7.0 0.0014 0.0182 0.0848 0.2555 0.5701 1.0430 1.6638 2.4063 3.2402 
8.0 0.0003 0.0053 0.0336 0.1221 0.3140 0.6418 1.1167 1.7301 2.4604 
9.0 0.0000 0.0015 0.0123 0.0540 0.1623 0.3709 0.7092 1.1858 1.7932 
10.0 0.0002 0.0041 0.0222 0.0773 0.2013 0.4259 0.7732 1.2511 
11.0 0.0001 0.0013 0.0085 0.0347 0.1028 0.2418 0.4792 0.8342 
12.0 0.0004 0.0030 0.0140 0.0495 0.1298 0.2822 0.5310 
13.0 0.0001 0.0010 0.0058 0.0225 0.0660 0.1580 0.3224 
14.0 0.0003 0.0022 0.0096 0.0319 0.0841 0.1871 
15.0 0.0001 0.0008 0.0039 0.0146 0.0427 0.1035 
16.0 0.0003 0.0015 0.0064 0.0206 0.0547 
17.0 0.0001 0.0006 0.0020 0.0095 0.0277 
18.0 0.0002 0.0010 0.0042 0.0134 
19.0 0.0001 0.0004 0.0018 0.0062 
20.0 0.0007 0.0028 
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To explain this example more vividly we work out the following four 
cases numerically (see Table III). 
TABLE III 
‘1 Distributions 
‘.__ 
Cases 
‘, ‘\ 
F = N(B,, aI') G = N(O,, az2) 
‘\ 
(4 
(‘4 
(4 
(4 
(O>l) (OJ4) 
(Rl) (191) 
Kw (1,4) 
(0.4) P,l) 
The optimum stopping rules for these four cases are shown in Tables IV 
and V. 
TABLE IV 
Case 1st movea 2nd move 3rd move 4th move 
Sample 17, -+ 
if y1 > 1.013, stop 
otherwise n, -+ if x1 > 0.798, stop 
(4 
otherwise n% - if yz> 0, stop 
otherwise n, -+ stop with x2 
Expected 
payoff 1.405 
Sample flz + 
if y1 > 1.168, stop 
otherwise IZ, -+ ( if x,> 1.083, stop 
1 if otherwise 
F-4 
sample ZI1 + 
if x2 > 1 stop 
otherwise 17, -+ stop with y2 
or 
sample fla -b if yn> 0, stop 
otherwise n, --f stop with x2 
Expected 
payoff 1.488 
a In columns of the 2nd. 3rd, and 4th moves, “if otherwise sample J? ” is abbre- 
viated by “otherwise ni”. 
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Case 1st move 
Sample l7, -+ 
if x1 > 2.009, stop 
otherwise 17, -+ 
if y1 ; 1.395, stop 
II ye > 0, stop 
(4 
otherwise II, --, 
otherwise II, -+ stop with x2 
Expected 
payoff 2.017 
Sample II, + 
if x1 > 1.685, stop 
otherwise n, -+ 
if xz> 1.399, stop 
(4 
otherwise II, 4 
If yz > 1, stop 
otherwise IIz -+ stop with yz 
Expected 
payoff 1.907 
Let /fit (i = 1, 2) be the expected payoff when using the optimal 
rule for the case of the only one population I7, with the maximum possible 
permissible number of drawings Ni. Then we have Table VI. 
TABLE VI 
f2,P t,(l) fJ2) fz(‘) fJ2’ 
- -. .- --. - -.. ~- .~ 
(4 1.405 0.790 1.580 0.399 0.798 
(‘4 1.488 0.790 1.790 0.399 1.399 
Cc) 2.017 0.790 2.580 0.399 1.798 
(4 1.907 1.580 1.790 0‘798 1.399 
REFERENCES 
1. BELLMAN, R. “Dynamic Programming.” Princeton Univ. Press, 1957. 
2. ROBBINS, H. When to stop. Ann. Math. Stat. 31, 241 (1960) (abstract). 
3. SASIENI, M., YASPAN, A., AND FRIEDMAN, L. “Operations Research: Methods 
and Problems.” Wiley, New York, 1959. 
